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POLITICS AND THE DEATH PENALTY: CAN
RATIONAL DISCOURSE AND DUE PROCESS
SURVIVE THE PERCEIVED POLITICAL
PRESSURE?t
NORMAN REDLICH:
Good morning. I am Norman Redlich, former dean of the New
York University Law School. The title of this program is "Politics
and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process
Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?".
I want to thank Ron Tabak, the program chair, for putting this
program together. In the interest of time, I will be introducing my-
self. You now know my name. I am the former Dean of NYU Law
School, and I am currently practicing law with a private firm.
I guess my claim to fame in the death penalty area is that I may
well have been the first lawyer in the country to litigate against the
death penalty as a form of punishment. In 1958, I organized the
New York Committee to Abolish Capital Punishment, which un-
dertook the task of stopping executions in New York State -
which it successfully accomplished. Before that, New York State
had executed quite a few people. Very few people know that
twelve of the last thirteen people to be executed in New York State
were either Black or Hispanic.' The last execution occurred in
1963,2 and two years later New York State abolished the death
penalty.
More recently, a few of us organized the New York State Justice-
PAC, which are a political action committee supported by contribu-
tions which promotes anti-death penalty candidates for the New
York State legislature. We look for candidates in districts where
t This transcript is taken from a program sponsored by the American Bar
Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities.
1. For information regarding the last thirteen executions in New York, see LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT, for the years 1955 through 1964.
2. In 1963, Eddie Lee Mays was the last person to be executed in the State of
New York. James R. Acker, New York's Proposed Death Penalty Legislation: Consti-
tutional and Policy Perspectives, 54 ALB. L. REV. 515, 526 (1990). In 1963, New York
became the last state to abandon mandatory capital punishment for first degree mur-
der. Id. at 522.
3. On June 1, 1965, legislation was implemented in New York that drastically
narrowed the types of crimes that were capital offenses, thereby accomplishing a vir-
tual abolition of the death penalty. Id. at 525. See generally id. at 522-30 (describing
the various legislation contributing to New York's abolition of the death penalty).
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the death penalty is an issue. One of the prime examples of our
success both in terms of the death penalty and in terms of the peo-
ple of Rochester and New York State is the fact that present on this
program is Assemblywoman Susan John, who was in part Justice-
PAC supported. She had a pro-death penalty opponent, and she'll
talk to you about that in due course.
At this point, I would just like to state the premise of this pro-
gram. This is not a debate on capital punishment. It may end up as
a debate on capital punishment, but it is not intended to be a de-
bate on capital punishment. We are trying to deal with a some-
what different issue - the perception that there is overwhelming
support in this country for the death penalty. Although that per-
ception may be accurate, it is in dispute. Nevertheless, the percep-
tion exists.
Our Justice-PAC in New York has challenged that perception. I
never thought I would live to see the day when it was headlined in
an Albany newspaper that "Support for Death Penalty Fatal For
Assemblymen."' 4 It was fatal to two candidates that were in sup-
port of capital punishment because they lost, notwithstanding the
fact that their opponents were opposed to the death penalty.
But that is the perception, and what we are trying to deal with
are the consequences of that perception. It has an effect on prose-
cutors, on courts, on clemency proceedings, on lawyers, on political
campaigns. We all know that President Clinton, then candidate
Clinton, returned to Arkansas for an execution. We know that
Governor Richards of Texas is now Governor of the state that has
the dubious distinction of being the execution capital of the United
States. It is part of the political process. It has an effect on the
media, and I think we have to be aware of that and acknowledge
the consequences of that perception. The death penalty has be-
come more politicized than ever, and there is no question that this
affects the entire criminal justice system.
Our first speaker is James Coleman. James Coleman is a profes-
sor of criminal law at Duke University School of Law. He teaches
a seminar on the death penalty. He is a graduate of Harvard Col-
lege and Columbia Law School and was Assistant General Counsel
for the Legal Services Corporation. He is active in issues related to
civil rights, the death penalty, and human rights. He is a member
4. See Robert Borsellino, Support for Death Penalty Fatal for Assemblymen: 2
Democrats Lose Primaries, TIMES UNION, Sept. 12, 1990, at 1.
5. See Jason Berry, Governors Backing Off Pardons, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 15, 1993 (Texas leads the nation in executions).
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of the council of the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibili-
ties, which, of course, is the section which sponsors this program.
And he chairs the Thurgood Marshall Awards Committee of that
section which was awarded at the very inspiring dinner the night
before last. Many of us were there to hear the presentation of the
Thurgood Marshall Award to Judge Frank Johnson, whose career is
legendary. Professor Coleman has provided post-conviction repre-
sentation for two clients under the sentence of death in Florida.
We welcome Professor Coleman.
PROFESSOR JAMES COLEMAN:
Ron asked me to provide some overview on what the Supreme
Court has done in the area of capital punishment, and he asked me
to do that in about five minutes. I'll try to do that. In looking at
the program, I guess the question that I would stress is whether the
states can implement the death penalty fairly, because that basi-
cally is the question that the Supreme Court has been dealing with
for quite some time.
In 1972, the Court in Furman v. Georgia6. decided that states
could not implement the death penalty fairly. Four years later, the
Court decided that, based on some changes that states had made in
how their death penalty was imposed, the states had corrected the
problems that led the Court in the Furman case to declare the
death penalty unconstitutional. 7 Thus, since 1976, we have basi-
cally had the death penalty in thirty-six states.8
The problem' that the Court identified with the manner in which
the death penalty was being imposed in 1972 had to do with its
arbitrariness: that is, that the jury that imposed the death penalty
had unguided discretion to decide to impose the death penalty
whenever it was available. The jury had the total discretion to de-
termine whether or not to impose the death penalty. Therefore, in
situations where the defendant was eligible for the death penalty,
there was no meaningful way to distinguish between cases in which
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
8. The following 38 jurisdictions (including 36 states) currently have death pen-
alty statutes: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, United
States Government, and United States Military. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDU-
CATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row U.S.A. (Summer 1993).
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the death penalty was imposed from cases in which it was not im-
posed. That led five of the justices on the Supreme Court to con-
clude that the death penalty was unconstitutional.
By 1976, the states, in response to the Furman decision, imple-
mented new death penalty statutes. Some states enacted
mandatory death penalty statutes which took away discretion alto-
gether. In other states, "guided discretion" statutes were insti-
tuted, under which trials were divided into two parts: the first part
for the jury to determine whether the defendant was guilty of the
capital offense, and the second part to determine whether the
death penalty should be imposed.9 In the second part of the trial,
these states established some guidelines, primarily to determine
who among the people convicted of a capital offense is eligible for
the death penalty. Once that determination is made, the juries are
then supposed to decide whether to impose the death penalty by
considering aggravating factors (factors that cut in favor of the
death penalty)10 and mitigating factors (which cut against the death
9. Today, every state has a guided discretion statute, as a mandatory death pen-
alty no longer exists. This means that the jury is never mandated to impose the death
penalty, but has the discretion to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Cf. Johnson v. Texas, 113 S.Ct. 2658 (1993) (holding that states are free to shape
consideration of mitigating evidence in death penalty cases).
However, in Florida, Alabama, and Indiana, judicial override statutes permit judges
to sentence a defendant to death notwithstanding the jury's decision against death.
Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of
the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797, 820-22 (1986).
In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. at 447 (1984), the Supreme Court held that Florida's
practice of judicial override is constitutional. Id. at 821.
10. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 210.6 (Sentence of Death for Murder; Further
Proceedings to Determine Sentence, Aggravating Circumstances):
a. The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of
imprisonment.
b. The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a fel-
ony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
c. At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed
another murder.
d. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many
persons.
e. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual inter-
course by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
f. The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
g. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
h. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting ex-
ceptional depravity.
[Vol. XXI242
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penalty).'1 But in terms of how the jury actually goes about weigh-
ing the aggravating and the mitigating factors, the statutes again
provide no guidance. 2
In my view, the effect of this is that we still have unguided dis-
cretion. While we now have procedures under which the defend-
ants are able to argue for a life sentence after they are convicted,
the juries are still left with the total discretion to impose the death
penalty. That, in fact, is what the Supreme Court has approved.
I also think that the Supreme Court itself has concluded that the
death penalty can't be implemented "fairly" in the sense that the
Court meant "fairly" in 1972 when it found that the death penalty
was arbitrary. I think that the best evidence of that is the case
called McCleskey'3 , in which the Court was faced with the question
of whether the race of the victim was the principal factor in deter-
mining who got the death penalty. There was a statistical study
which indicated that the race of the victim was, in fact, a principal
factor that determined who got the death penalty, 4 and the
Supreme Court accepted that conclusion for the purposes of mak-
ing its decision. In other words, the Court said, it would accept the
fact that it appeared that race was a factor in the imposition of the
death penalty.' 5 The Court held the question then was to what ex-
tent would it tolerate the risk that race was a factor in the imposi-
11. See id.:
B. Mitigating Circumstances
a. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
b. The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influ-
ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
c. The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
d. The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
e. The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another
person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
f. The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another
person.
g. At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect
or intoxication.
h. The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
12. See Graham v. Collins, 113 S.Ct 892 (1993) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
13. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
14. The Baldus study submitted to the court in McCleskey demonstrated that de-
fendants who killed white victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death
penalty as defendants who killed black victims. Id. at 287.
15. See id. at 292 n.7 ("As did the Court of Appeals, we assume the study is valid
statistically without reviewing the factual findings of the District Court.").
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tion of the death penalty. 16 The Court held that the defendant in
the case had failed to establish that this risk was intolerable under
the Constitution. 17
In i972, in Furman, faced with a much less elaborate study, some
of the Justices thought that if there was any rational basis to deter-
mine why the death penalty was imposed, race was a principal fac-
tor. That led to their vote in 1972. In 1987, in McCleskey, I think
the Court in effect had abandoned that approach. I think they
abandoned it because the Court concluded that the death penalty
could not be administered fairly: you could not establish a system
under which you could protect a defendant from the arbitrary im-
position of the death penalty. It is impossible to prevent a jury
from taking into consideration race or any other inappropriate fac-
tors in the imposition of the death penalty; and unless you were
willing to declare the death penalty unconstitutional, in effect you
had to accept the risk that some arbitrary factor would determine
its imposition.
The Court, in addition to reaching that conclusion, took steps to
prevent defendants from being able to litigate challenges to the
death penalty, challenges against the system. It started in 1983 by
permitting the federal Court of Appeals to summarily review con-
stitutional challenges to the death penalty.' 8 In Barefoot v. Estelle,
the Court held that in cases where the defendant had challenged
his conviction and sentence but had lost his state court appeals, the
federal courts don't need to go through the full procedures that
they ordinarily would go through to review a conviction and death
sentence; they can do the review summarily.' 9
That opened the doors for courts, in effect, to duck the issue by
simply passing it along. I think of some of the cases that we have
seen where courts dismiss constitutional issues that they have con-
cluded were not frivolous."0 Instead, what the courts have done,
led by the Supreme Court, is erect procedural devices that have the
16. See id. at 281 ("This case [McCleskey] presents the question whether a com-
plex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into capital
sentencing determinations proves that petitioner McCleskey's capital sentence is un-
constitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.").
17. Id. at 297 ("[Wle hold that the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an
inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's case acted with discrimina-
tory purpose.").
18. See Tabak, supra note 9, at 834-38 (discussing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983) and its repercussions).
19. Id.
20. If the courts had concluded that the issues were frivolous, they simply could
have gotten rid of the cases on that ground.
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effect of preventing the defendant from litigating his claims on the
merits.
The Supreme Court, for example, decided the case of Teague v.
Lane,2 in which it barred the defendant from litigating a "new"
claim in which the defendant argued for the recognition of a consti-
tutional claim that had not been recognized before. The effect of
this is that the Court will not permit litigation of a "new" claim in a
habeas action. Thus, a defendant is left to litigate "novel" claims
only at trial and on direct appeal.
The other thing the Court has done is to use procedural default
and something called "abuse of the writ" to avoid having to reach
the merits of a constitutional claim.22 Procedural default involves
procedural devices that, in effect, say that if the defendant initially
fails to raise a claim in the state court, and the state court later
decides not to hear the merits of the claim for that reason, then the
federal court will not hear the claim on the merits unless the de-
fendant can meet a very high standard that in most cases cannot be
met.23 The same holds true for the "abuse of the writ" doctrine
which provides that when a defendant has litigated one habeas pe-
tition, he can't raise claims in a second petition unless he can meet
this very high standard.24
One thing the Court just recently did was to change the standard
of the burden of proof in a habeas case where a defendant has
21. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), petitioner, through a writ of habeas
corpus, sought to apply the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement to the
petit jury. The Court never reached that question because it formulated a narrow test
for retroactivity for cases on collateral review. Id. at 292. In Teague, the Court held
that, unless one of two narrow exceptions applies, new constitutional rules would not
apply retroactively on collateral review. Id. at 310-11. A new rule would be applied
retroactively only if: a) it makes the conduct non-criminal, or b) it is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. Id. at 311. Under the approach adopted by the Court,
there could be no retroactive application of the fair cross-section requirement to the
petit jury. Id. at 316. See also Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) (rule not appli-
cable to review of defendant's conviction because it did not fall into one of the two
narrow exceptions). For a discussion of retroactivity, see Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark
Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative "Reform" of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Criti-
cal Analysis of Recent Developments and Current Proposals, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1, 44-46
(1991).
22. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 21, at 50-52, 84-88 (discussing abuse of the writ
in capital cases).
23. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992) ("Unless a habeas peti-
tioner shows cause and prejudice, a court may not reach the merits of: ... new claims
not previously raised which constitute ... procedurally defaulted claims in which the
petitioner failed to follow applicable state procedural rules in raising the claims.").
24. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (denying relief because petitioner
failed to show cause for his failure to raise sixth amendment claim in first federal
habeas petition).
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succeeded in demonstrating that there has been a constitutional er-
ror.' The Court now requires that a defendant show that the error
was prejudicial.26 In the past, the burden had been on the prosecu-
tor: once the defendant established a constitutional violation, then
the burden was on the prosecutor to show that it was harmless.
The Court's new standard provides a way of avoiding having to
reverse a conviction even though there was a constitutional error.
The Court now, in effect, has said that even if the defendant jumps
through all the procedural hoops and manages to convince the
judge that there was a constitutional violation, the defendant still
has to demonstrate that that constitutional violation caused him
harm. Thus, in the years since the Court reinstituted the death
penalty, it has become increasingly more difficult for defendants to
litigate the constitutionality of their convictions and sentences.
Let me close by saying that I -think that anybody who has han-
dled a death penalty case recognizes the role of politics in these
cases, and in some cases very directly. One of the cases that I liti-
gated in Florida started in 1986,27 when Governor Bob Graham
was running for the U.S. Senate. He signed four death warrants
between February and November, when his election was held. This
same client was executed in 1989 under Bob Martinez, who was
Governor at that time.28 In 1990, he used my client as a prominent
part of his campaign for re-election. In a state like Florida, the
death penalty is one of the principal factors in politics.
DEAN REDLICH:
It's interesting that in New York State, our present governor and
our last governor both were elected and re-elected (in Cuomo's
case, several times) and have been strong opponents of the death
penalty. Further, they were opposed by people who were strong
proponents of the death penalty. Nonetheless, they have managed
to survive in New York State - and not by small majorities. That
25. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
26. See id. at 1722 (prejudicial standard applies in determining whether habeas
relief must be granted because of constitutional error of the trial type).
27. The case that professor Coleman referred to was his participation in the de-
fense of Ted Bundy in Florida. Court of Appeals decisions on Bundy's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus include Bundy v. Wainwright, 808 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1987),
and Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988).
28. Florida Governor Bob Martinez ran commercials in his re-election campaign
in which he bragged, "I now have signed 90 death warrants in the state of Florida,"
and which featured "the smirking face of serial killer Ted Bundy." Richard Cohen,
Playing Politics with the Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Mar. 26-Apr. 1, 1990.
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is an example of the fact that oftentimes political figures tend to
exaggerate the impact of this issue - although I do not doubt that,
as the rest of the world says, New York may be different.
Shabaka was born as Joseph Green Brown in Charleston, South
Carolina. He spent fourteen years on death row in the Florida
state penitentiary, where he came within fifteen hours of being exe-
cuted after being convicted of rape, murder and robbery - charges
that were later dropped. He was released in 1987, after serving
fifteen years in prison for crimes he did not commit. In the subse-
quent proceedings that led to the ultimate overturning of his con-
viction, instances of prosecutorial misconduct were found to have
been blatant.
Shabaka's ordeal has been documented in numerous newspaper
stories.29 He currently resides in Temple Hill, Maryland. We are
pleased to welcome Shabaka to this panel.
SHABAKA SUNDIATA WAGLINI:
I want to thank you. Before I begin, I see Judge Kravitch is
among us. Judge Kravitch, can you stand? Judge Kravitch was one
of the judges who sat on the federal Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit in my case,3" and I was blessed this past Saturday night
to finally see and meet this wonderful lady. I want to say that I love
you, my wife loves you, my mother loves you, and my whole family
loves you.
As Mr. Coleman already mentioned, in the State of Florida no
one can deny politics influences discussion about the death penalty.
Florida has a bifurcated system. In one system, you are found
guilty, and in the other the jury recommends the sentence. Florida
is relatively unique in that if the jury brings back a recommenda-
tion for mercy, the judge has it within his power to override the
recommendation and still give out the death penalty.3'
From my days on death row, I cannot remember during those
years or even today any politician that was ever elected to state
office that opposed capital punishment. I believe that this is what
we are here to talk about today. Capital punishment is not a moral
issue; it is not a religious issue. Capital punishment is a political
issue. That's how it was then, and that's how it always will be. And
29. See, e.g., Paul Grondhal, Executioner's Other Song: Innocent on Death Row,
TIMES UNION, Apr. 20, 1992, at Cl; Lawrence L. Knutson, Freed Death Row Inmate
Urges More Protection For Condemned, PHILA. INQ., July 25, 1993, at A03.
30. See Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1986).
31. See Tabak, supra note 9, at 820-22 (discussing judicial override).
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as soon as we recognize that, I think we can then go about the
business of getting rid of it.
I spent fourteen and a half years of my life on death row and,
yes, I came within fifteen hours of being executed for a crime I did
not commit. Time does not permit me to go into certain aspects of
my case; I am not here to talk about that. Allow me to say that
politics and capital punishment are one and the same.
We have heard a lot about victims and politicians crying about
victims. There are many victims when you talk about this issue. I
know about victimization. I know and have seen victimization.
The State of Florida killed sixteen men while I was there, and I
came close to being number seventeen.32
It is difficult to picture in one's mind living in a state where the
whole issue of capital punishment is one of politics. A governor
signs a death warrant and the prison guards immediately have a bet
on whether or not you will get a stay of execution. You can not
picture a governor like Bob Graham, at that time (he is now a
United States Senator). When he signed my death warrant in Sep-
tember of 1983, he left the State of Florida to go on a trip to China.
If I had not been granted a stay by the United States District
Court, the governor would not have been around to hear a clem-
ency appeal.
Speaking of clemency, Florida does have a clemency procedure,
but that does not remove the political dimension. I can only speak
of my individual case, and I clearly remember that during my clem-
ency proceeding the Assistant Attorney General for the State of
Florida interrupted my clemency proceeding to inform Governor
Graham and his cabinet that he himself had serious doubts about
my guilt. Three weeks later, Governor Graham came in the room
to sign my death warrant for me to be put to death. It did not
matter what his Assistant Attorney General thought. We can't al-
low such penalties to be on the books anywhere in this country,
where there is so much unfairness.
The unfairness begins at the trial level. In my particular case, my
trial lawyer was three years out of law school.33 The trial lawyer,
after my conviction, stayed on my case until midway through the
32. There are currently about 325 people on Florida's death row. NAACP LEGAL
DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. (Summer 1993).
33. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 21, at 830-35 for a discussion about who repre-
sents people on death row. See also Ira P. Robbins, American Bar Association, Crim-
inal Justice Section, Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just
and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AMER. UNIV. L. REV.
1, 62-71 (1990); Sherrill, Death Row on Trial, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 13 1983, § 6, at 80, 100.
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appeal in state court. In the State of Florida, the lawyer who han-
dles the trial must also handle the automatic appeal. But once this
lawyer leaves your case after this appeal, Florida is not bound by
statute to give you another lawyer.34 You must find another lawyer
the best way you can.35 And that's what happened in my case.
The delay of my case while I was on death row was not brought
upon by anything of my own doing. I didn't have a lawyer. I was
not guaranteed a lawyer. Even at my trial, I was not guaranteed a
lawyer, because if I had been, I would not have received a "lawyer"
three years out of law school; there would have been resources
there. Even today, in 1993, there is still a deficiency in counsel at
the trial level. The resources are still not there.36
As for those who advocate for the death penalty and the over-
throw of habeas, I would challenge each and every one of those
individuals to provide a defendant with the same quality of repre-
sentation as the State. The State has a whole apparatus behind the
quality of the investigation - the whole county and city police
forces - and the defense has nothing. So, I say, begin at the state
level. But we must stop allowing judges, prosecutors, and even
governors to be elected into office where every decision is based
upon politics, as to whether or not they grant clemency, and
whether or not they override a jury recommendation of mercy. We
must stop this. We must be persistent so that politics will be re-
moved from the judicial system.
DEAN REDLICH:
Thank you for that moving talk. Judge Kravitch, I would like to
welcome you on behalf of the entire panel as well. Our third
speaker is a late entry, but a very welcome one, the Attorney Gen-
eral of Pennsylvania, Ernest Preate, Jr., who is an elected official.
He was recently re-elected as Pennsylvania State Attorney Gen-
eral. He has a prior career as district attorney in Scranton, Penn-
sylvania. He personally tried nineteen murder cases, and in five
cases out of seven, the jurors returned death penalty verdicts. He
has argued many homicide cases on appeal - the most recent case,
34. Florida does have a capital legislation resource center, but it does not repre-
sent very many people itself. Tabak supra note 9, at 830-31.
35. See Murray v. Giarratano, 429 U.S. 1 (1989) (no constitutional right to a post-
conviction attorney in death penalty cases); see also Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane,
The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-Of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty,
23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 59, 83-85 (1989).
36. See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth
Amendment, 78 IOWA. L. REV. 433 (1993).
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decided by the Supreme Court in 1990, was the Blystone case.37 In
Blystone, the Supreme Court upheld the Pennsylvania death pen-
alty statute against a facial challenge which asserted that
Pennsylvania's procedures mandated the death penalty upon a
finding of guilt for first degree murder.3 8
Attorney General Preate has written a manual for use by prose-
cutors, judges, defense lawyers - but primarily for the prosecutors
- on the trial of death penalty cases. He has lectured on the sub-
ject, and he has been very much involved in the legislative efforts
that are going on in Congress with regard to the federal crime bill
and the changes that have been proposed with regard to federal
habeas corpus. We welcome Attorney General Preate to our
panel.
ATT'ORNEY GENERAL ERNEST PREATE, JR.:
Thank you very much, Dean. I appreciate the chance to be here,
and the opportunity to provide some insight into the prosecution's
side on this very, very important issue. I think the issue here today
is not whether we should have the death penalty, in all due respect
to some folks who believe we should not, but whether our system
can provide for fairness and effective assistance of counsel in death
penalty litigation. In short, can a prosecutor seek to have a system
that ensures fairness, with effective assistance of counsel for the
defendant? I believe that in too many of our capital cases there is
ineffective assistance of counsel on both sides. Such trials are not
fair, not fair to defendants like Shabaka and not fair to people who
37. 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
38. In Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990), the defendant, Blystone,
robbed and killed a hitchhiker named Smithburger. Blystone was charged with and
convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit homicide,
and criminal conspiracy to commit robbery.
After convicting Blystone, the jury found as an aggravating circumstance that he
"committed the killing while in the perpetration of a felony." Because the jury did
not find any mitigating circumstances, it sentenced him to death pursuant to a Penn-
sylvania statute, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv), which provided that "[tihe ver-
dict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating
circumstance . . . and no mitigating circumstances or if the jury finds one or more
aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances." Id.
The Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania statute did not violate the Eighth
Amendment, since it allowed the capital sentencing jury to consider and give effect to
all relevant mitigating evidence. The Court also found that the statute was not im-
permissably mandatory, because it did not impose the death penalty unless the aggra-
vating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, or unless no mitigating
circumstances were present. Blystone, 494 U.S. at 304-05.
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the prosecutor represents - surviving members of the victim's
family.
I believe that there is no finer example of what our profession is
all about than two experienced and knowledgeable trial attorneys
arguing before a fact finder. For that reason, I support capital re-
source centers for the defense and for the prosecution. For that
same reason, I support the establishment of counsel standards for
trial and appellate counsel, with a list of competent and qualified
counsel established by the highest courts of the state. I also sup-
port state and federal funding for death penalty litigation centers
and for counsel at both the trial and appellate levels. And in order
to assure that there is prompt and effective federal oversight of
state proceedings, I support federal habeas reform.
What have I done about it? Well, for the last five months, as
Chairman of the National Association of Attorneys General Crimi-
nal Law Committee, representing my brother and sister attorneys
general, I've worked with Senator Joe Biden (Chairman of the
United States Senate Judiciary Committee) and his staff, with Janet
Reno and with her staff, and with the leadership of the National
District Attorneys Association. We have been working to come up
with proposals that would reform habeas corpus, proposals that
would permit individuals who are seeking redress in the federal
system because of state court errors to obtain that redress, and pro-
posals that would mandate effective counsel at both the trial and
appellate court levels. It would no longer be satisfactory to have
lawyers three years out of law school trying death penalty cases. In
such cases, there would be funding for the litigation centers, the
trial, the appeal, as well as for the investigative help both the pros-
ecution and defense need in these most important cases.
39
You may think it's easy for someone on the prosecution side to
do that, but when I proposed to work with Senator Biden, it was
not an easy thing. Lots of people said, "You can't work with Joe
Biden. He is not going to be in favor of working with prosecutors."
I did not find that to be the case. I found Senator Biden to be
open, earnest, diligent, and knowledgeable, and a competent
United States Senator in this area. He may be competent in lots of
other areas, but he was particularly competent in this area and
knowledgeable, as was his staff.
We proposed a draft for the new crime bill that evolved in early
June, and we circulated it around the nation amongst the prosecu-
39. See Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1993, 138 CONG. REC. S10925 (daily ed.
Aug. 6, 1993).
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tors. The prosecutors did not like that draft, and took a lot of shots
at me for working with Senator Biden to try to develop some
meaningful habeas corpus reform, particularly the establishment of
counsel standards. We went back to work again in June or July and
produced a draft dated August 4, 1993, which is now in the process
of being circulated around the nation, and I think this one is going
to have a much more positive reception.40
The bill containing the proposal for the draft on habeas was in-
troduced by the Senator on Friday [August 6, 1993]. I have a rough
copy of it here. I know some of you might be interested in taking a
look at it, and I'll share it with you later on. Senator Dole and
Senator Hatch, with whom I've also had extensive conversations as
late as last week on federal habeas reform and the crime bill itself,
have introduced a provision on habeas corpus reform that passed
the Senate in 1991, 41 as part of this year's Republican crime bill.
There is, in my sense, a growing awareness in Congress and in
the Senate of the need to achieve some kind of habeas corpus re-
form and to have it settled outside of the emotion of the death
penalty debate. I think this is such a critical area of the law.
Habeas corpus has not been touched in one hundred years, and we
were all very, very conscious of that as we attempted to draft the
provisions.
You folks out there, when you see it, might have a better idea
than we had. God knows, we've had some ideas put up the flag-
pole and have immediately been shot down. We're looking forward
to a rational discourse. That's one of the reasons I am here today.
This Section has a duty to encourage rational discourse on impor-
tant principles of law outside of the supercharged emotional and
political challenges that are raised in the debate on capital punish-
ment and the death penalty.
I think it is time to step back and to look at habeas corpus re-
form, to look at the effective assistance of counsel, because it's the
foundation of our entire system. Capital cases are on the cutting
edge of the development of constitutional law in the criminal area,
40. The different crime bills which passed the Senate and the House in 1993 did
not contain any provisions concerning habeas corpus. Despite Attorney General
Preate's support, Senator Bidens's habeas corpus proposals in 1993 were attacked by
many prosecutors, as well as by many advocates for death row inmates. It is likely
that different legislation concerning habeas corpus will be introduced in 1994.
41. See § 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S9982, S9999-10001 (daily
ed. July 15, 1991) (text of habeas corpus provisions which passed the Senate in 1991);
see also 137 CONG. REC. S9832 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (final passage of omnibus
crime bill containing those habeas corpus provisions).
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and these kinds of cases ought to be tried by our best lawyers, then
appealed by the best lawyers, on both sides, and then argued
before juries and before courts by people of experience, knowledge
and competence.
So, we are working on this issue. Can a prosecutor do it and
work with the liberal Democrats? This prosecutor, I think, has
done it.
DEAN REDLICH:
Thank you, Attorney General Preate. I am sure there will be a
great many questions that will be asked of you. I am pleased that
you joined us. Our next speaker is Bryan Stevenson, who is the
Executive Director of the Alabama Capital Representation Re-
source Center in Montgomery, Alabama. He graduated from
Harvard Law School, and holds a graduate degree in public policy
from the Harvard School of Government. He recently secured the
release of Walter McMillian from Alabama's death row. He, like
our previous speaker, has produced manuals on capital litigation.
He was a staff attorney for the Southern Center for Human Rights
in Atlanta, Georgia. He, too, has lectured extensively on death
penalty litigation and race and poverty issues and the federal jus-
tice system. He was awarded the ABA Wisdom Medal for public
service litigation and he has also been awarded the ACLU Na-
tional Medal of Liberty. Bryan Stevenson, welcome.
BRYAN STEVENSON:
Thank you. It's a real honor for me to be here with you and with
the ABA, particularly this Section, which has worked so hard on
issues like capital punishment. I want to congratulate the ABA
and this Section for holding a panel on politics and the death pen-
alty. I believe that political influences in the administration of cap-
ital punishment are at the heart of what is so frustrating to many
who deal with these issues day by day, both judges, lawyers, and
even some prosecutors.
A few years ago, I found myself sitting in the chambers of a state
court judge right before we were about to have a hearing. The
hearing was for a ruling on the state post-conviction petition we
had filed in a capital case where we presented a great deal of evi-
dence concerning the unconstitutionality of this black defendant's
19941
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
capital murder conviction and death sentence.4 2 And it was inter-
esting to be sitting in the judge's chambers before the hearing
began.
He began talking to one of his investigators, just generally about
the political environment, and I was sitting with my co-counsel and
my client, and I was listening very, very closely to some of the
things that the judge was saying. He was complaining about the
recent gubernatorial campaign that had taken place in Alabama.
We had a gubernatorial candidate in Alabama who, in running for
governor, made a pledge that he was going to "fry them 'till their
eyes pop out. '43 You could get a bumper sticker in support of this
candidate and you'd get billboards and have this phrase, "Fry
them, 'till their eyes pop out." He was a former Attorney General.
And this judge, sitting before this hearing, started complaining to
one of the law enforcement people sitting in the room. "You
know, it really makes me mad," the judge said to the law enforce-
ment officer, "that this guy runs around saying 'Fry them 'till their
eyes pop out' I couldn't go down to Holman Prison and actually
pull the switch and fry somebody and watch them die like he claims
he wants to do." And the judge looked at the police officer and
said, "Jimmy, could you go down there and pull the switch and fry
somebody 'till their eyes pop out?" And the police officer said,
"No, sir, judge, I could not do that." And sitting there before we
were about to get the ruling in the state postconviction hearing, it
was very encouraging to me that this judge seemed to be sensitive
to this political dynamic, this concern about rhetoric that takes so
much precedence over justice and fairness.
And then the court reporter walked in, and it was almost as if
someone had said, "Act One will begin now". The judge stood up
and put his robe on and he sat back down, and then he started
filling the record with all these stern pronouncements about how
our client was to die and how he was to be executed and how in X
many days he wanted to see this case move through the process,
and how he was frustrated that it had taken so long to get this man
into the electric chair. And he rejected all of our claims, and he
rejected all of our arguments, even though the evidence, in our
view, was quite overwhelming. This defendant was someone who
42. State v. Jefferson, No. CC-81-77 (Chambers County, Ala.), affd 473 So. 2d
1100 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (imposition of death penalty upheld).
43. This gubernatorial candidate was former Attorney General Charles Graddick.
See Bill Peterson, Alabama Political Tide Takes Turn to the Left; Top Contender for
Governor Runs as a Liberal, WASH. POST, May 31, 1986, at A4.
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not only deserved a new trial, but who deserved actual judicial
relief.
In this case, we had an issue of racial discrimination in jury selec-
tion because the prosecutor had organized the jury pool into four
groups. He put some of the jurors on a list marked "strong," he
put some of the jurors on a list marked "medium," he put some of
the jurors on a list marked "weak," and he put all of the black
jurors on a list marked "black." The prosecutor in this particular
case exercised twenty-four peremptory challenges against twenty-
four of the twenty-six black people qualified for jury service. After
achieving an all-white jury, he stood up and made an argument to
the jury in this burglary/murder case that "We have got to send a
message to 'them.'" We thought that the evidence was over-
whelming in support of our claim of racial bias.45 But it really is
this political dynamic that we are discussing today that made it not
only possible, but comfortable, for this judge - after professing
such concern and disagreement with the prevailing politics of the
time - to rule against the way the law would have him rule, and
to rule that way with gusto, and with the same kind of rhetoric to
fuel this process.
Like Florida, Alabama has a statute that permits judicial over-
ride,46 and in some ways it's one of the clearest measures of the
political influence in the administration of capital punishment. Un-
like Florida, Alabama does not have standards which regulate
when a judge can or cannot override a jury verdict of life. As
Shabaka explained, what happens is the jury can return the verdict
of life imprisonment, but the judge has the authority to override
that verdict and impose the death penalty.
Approximately one hundred and twenty people are on death
row in the State of Alabama.4 ' Nearly twenty-five percent of those
44. See State v. Jefferson, No. CC-81-77 (Chambers County, Ala. 1984). The exact
quotation from the trial transcript is:
I submit to you ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as soon as we start burning
a few of them, and sentence them to death, for the kind of crimes that they
are committing, they are going to think twice before they start cutting some-
body's head off and before they start shooting, and before they start raping,
and there's only one way to do that, and that's to show them that we mean
business. Show them that we mean business.
Id. at 164.
45. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (Equal Protection Clause forbids
prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of race).
46. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (1982).
47. As of the summer of 1993, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. documented 117 people on death row in the State of Alabama. NAACP LEGAL
DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. (Summer 1993).
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people received life verdicts from juries.4 8 When you do a statisti-
cal study, a mini-multiple regression analysis of how the death pen-
alty is applied and how override is applied, there is a statistically
significant correlation between judicial override and election years
in most of the counties where these overrides take place. And it is
one of the clearest examples of the precise dynamic of politics in
the administration of the death penalty.
We also see this political dynamic at work in the legislature. We,
in Alabama, just had new statutes added to our capital code which
provide for the death penalty any time there is a victim under the
age of fourteen. 9 So for the first time we are now seeing a new
spate of cases involving domestic child killings or abuse killings -
tragic cases that are now being prosecuted as capital murder cases.
We are also seeing cases involving younger and younger
defendants.
This dynamic not only imposes real serious obstacles for people
in getting fairness, but it also has an irrational effect on the way we
think about crime. For example, sixty-three percent of the homi-
cides committed in Alabama are of African Americans.5 Poor
people are considerably more likely to be victims of homicides in
that state.5' And it's because poor and minority people are in such
great risk of violent crime and victimization that the need for ra-
tional discourse not only about the death penalty, but about deal-
ing with the problems of crime is so critical.
I think about this all the time, and I think about the 2800 people
on death row. There about 2800 people on death row in this coun-
try,52 and I dare say you could kill everybody that is on Alabama's
death row today, and kill all 2800 people on all of America's death
48. See Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama's Capital De-
fense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 ALA. L. REV. 1 n.67 (1992) (citing
Tracking Project, Alabama Capital Representation Resource Center, Montgomery,
Alabama (1992)) ("Nearly a quarter of the defendants sent to Alabama's death row
arrived there after a jury had recommended the life-without-parole option.").
49. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (1975 & Supp. 1993).
50. STATE OF ALABAMA CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION CENTER, 1992 CRIME
IN ALABAMA 29 (1992).
51. This figure is derived from the number of homicide victims where economic
data is available.
52. See Dick Lehr, Death Penalty Foes Seek a New Debate, See Stronger Case,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 1993, at 1 ("Traditionally, supporters of the death penalty
have argued that executions are a deterrent. But the statistics tend not to support
that assertion. In Texas, the nation's leader in executions with 54 since 1977, the mur-
der rate for the past decade has hovered between 12 and 14 murders annually per
100,000 residents, according to U.S. Department Justice figures. In Florida, which has
executed 29 prisoners, the murder rate has held at about 11 per 100,000 residents.").
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rows, and none of us would be any safer walking the streets of Chi-
cago, Detroit, Los Angeles or Miami. And there's not really much
disagreement about that.5 3 Yet, we persist in using the death pen-
alty as a symbol of strength, of power, and resolve, in dealing with
violent crime. And it's particularly frustrating when I think about
the hopelessness that such an irrational discourse has, not only on
people who are engaged in struggles within the criminal justice sys-
tem, but on people who are living in the community.
I can't help but think about it during the times when I go into
low-income areas to meet the siblings of my clients. Not long ago I
was in the Montgomery, Alabama housing projects and I saw two
kids sitting on the doorsteps. One of them was eight and one was
about nine. They were talking very excitedly about something. I
figured they were talking about Michael Jordan and basketball, or
baseball, or some sports hero. So I walked closer to hear what they
were talking about, and I was very surprised to hear that they
weren't talking about sports or what was on television or in the
movies. They were talking about guns. The eight year-old was say-
ing to the nine year-old, "Man, you got to get yourself a 9 mm that
can shoot this many rounds. You should see the gun that Johnny
has." The nine year-old said to the eight year old, "No, man, that
ain't any good. You got to get the kind that can shoot this many
rounds in this many seconds." And they were preoccupied with
these weapons of violence as a measure of esteem, a measure of
success.
I think about it when I talk to clients' siblings - these kids who
are fourteen years old and don't believe they are going to live past
the age of eighteen. Once you start talking to them about some of
the things that they are doing, and they say, "I don't believe I'm
going to live past eighteen. It doesn't matter what I do." Obvi-
ously, when you think that way, you have a very different orienta-
tion to law and to society. And that kind of hopelessness, in so
many ways, is driven by the irrationality surrounding us, especially
in criminal justice, especially in our discussions about fairness, and,
yes, in our discussions about the death penalty.
I think about it when I think about the one or two times we've
had to be in situations where we were unable to get stays of execu-
tion. A couple of years ago, I found myself driving from my office
in Alabama to Holman Prison, to be with a man whose case we had
53. See id. ("A bare majority of Americans, 51 percent, now think the death pen-
alty has a deterrent effect, according to the 1991 Gallup poll, a decline from 61 per-
cent of those questioned in 1986.").
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taken on just three weeks before his scheduled execution. I drove
down there after we had failed to receive a stay from the U.S.
Supreme Court. I got involved in this case because this man got an
execution date even though his lawyers had basically abandoned
him and he said, "Just represent me for these last few weeks. I am
not asking you to do something that you can't do. You're probably
not going to be able to get a stay. But I have to have some hope to
get through these last twenty-one days. I can't make it even until
the day of execution unless somebody gives me some hope and
stands with me and tries to do something." We got involved and
unfortunately didn't get a stay. And I went down, and throughout
the night of his execution this dynamic of hopelessness related to
irrationality was very present in my mind. I went down there and
spent the last thirty minutes with this man, and we were standing
there and we were trying to deal with all the horrible things that
were going on and he started asking questions, and he said: "You
know it's been a very strange day." I said, "What do you mean?"
He said, "When I woke up this morning, the guards, they said
'What can we get you for breakfast?' and then they said 'What can
we get you for lunch?' and then they said 'What can we get you for
dinner?' and they said 'Do you need to use the phone?"' and, he
said, "Every fifteen minutes somebody came and said 'What can
we do to help you? Can we get you some cigarettes? Can we get
you some coffee? Do you need to call somebody? Do you need
some stamps?"' And he said something that still resonates in my
mind. He said, "You know, it's interesting. More people have
asked me what they can do to help me in the last fourteen hours of
my life than they ever did in the first nineteen years of my life."
When I think about this state of irrationality and hopelessness, I
can't help but ask the question: Yes, where were you when he was
three, being physically abused; or when he was six, and being sexu-
ally assaulted by his step-father; or when he was nine and starting
to experiment with heroin; or when he was fourteen and strung out
and homeless with no place to go? And yet, we persist in talking
about crime in terms of habeas corpus and the death penalty.
I'm encouraged to hear some of the things Mr. Preate said this
morning. I, too, am committed and hopeful that we can get to a
system of justice that does provide people accused of capital crimes
with the best lawyers, with the kind of rigor and the kind of treat-
ment that gives us hope that there won't be more Shabakas and
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Walter McMillians.54 But I am frankly skeptical that we can
achieve this when we talk about a crime bill that uses restricting
habeas corpus and expanding the federal death penalty as its cen-
terpiece. And it's really in that context that we are in desperate
need of leadership.
I think that there is a tendency to depreciate the centrality of the
criminal justice system and even the enforcement of the death pen-
alty in the hopes and aspirations of people who live on the margins.
I think about this in connection with African-Americans. It is very
clear to me that in the last twenty to twenty-five years the most
vivid and the most painful manifestations of the frustrations of
many poor people and African-Americans have come surrounding
events and incidents relating to the criminal justice system: the
Rodney King disturbances, the disturbances in Florida, the distur-
bances in other communities when people have the perception that
justice cannot be had and that rationality cannot dominate over
bias and bigotry. It's central because any democratic society that
defines itself by its commitment to laws as a means of achieving
justice must do better than we presently see in the administration
of the death penalty.
I represent a black man named Walter McMillian who was re-
leased from prison after being on death row for nearly six years for
a crime he did not commit. The political influences were all around
this case. This man was someone who received a life verdict from
the jury. But the judge, a man named Robert E. Lee Key, over-
rode the jury's verdict and imposed the death penalty. This was a
man who was put on death row in Alabama a year before he ever
went to trial, and while he was awaiting trial, the law enforcement
people in his community conspired with the Department of Correc-
tions and placed him on death row. This was a man who had nu-
merous witnesses, who could prove where he was at the time of
crime, and all these folks were rejected because of this desire to get
someone sentenced to death for a particular crime.
As we move forward, we must not only recognize that the polit-
ical influences that work their ways into particular cases are lead-
ing to the kind of injustices that Shabaka has described, but that
these injustices have implications for all of us. The reason that they
have implications for us all is that we are, in fact, the managers of
54. See Alabama Releases Man Held on Death Row for Six Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1993, at 1; On the Fast Track from the Courtroom to Death Row, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1993, § 4, at 2; The Murder Case that Unraveled, ABA JOURNAL, June 1993, at
30; Five Years on Death Row, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1993, at 27.
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our systems of justice. Lawyers, people who are committed to ad-
ministering justice as judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys
are all the custodians of justice in this society.
It is simply not enough to acknowledge these political factors
that are affecting us, forcing us to do this and that. Instead, we
must recognize that ultimately we have the authority to act respon-
sibly, to act judiciously, and to act fairly within this system. It is
really in that spirit that I hope we can continue this discussion that
we started today in framing a vision of justice that's better, a vision
of justice that gets us past where we are and a little closer to where
we need to be.
It's been a wonderful two days for me to be here and talk with so
many who seem to share that vision of justice, and I really hope
that this Section and organization can continue to provide leader-
ship. After such a long period of time where hopelessness and
politics have reigned, this kind of strong leadership is badly
needed.
DEAN REDLICH:
Thank you, Bryan.
Nat Hentoff is a columnist for the Village Voice and the Wash-
ington Post, and a staff writer for the New Yorker. He is one of the
foremost authorities in the areas of First Amendment defense,
journalistic responsibility, and freedom of expression generally.
He has published biographies, novels, children's literature, and
books on jazz. He is a graduate of Northeastern University, and a
Fulbright Fellow. He was awarded the ABA Silver Gavel Award
in 1980 for his coverage of the law and criminal justice issues. Nat,
I am sure when the day comes when the ABA creates its Golden
Gavel Award, you'll be right up there as one of its first recipients.
Nat Hentoff.
NAT HENTOFF:
With regard to one thing the Attorney General said, I wish it
were possible to become engaged in a rational discourse with the
Chief Justice. The question today concerns not only lawyers,
judges and legislatures, but also the press. Thomas Jefferson said
that this peculiar institution, the constitutional democracy, depends
on its citizens being sufficiently informed so that they can govern
themselves. Yet, he grew to hate the press. In his last years, he
read only one paper, and he read it for its advertisements. But he
knew how crucial accurate information and analysis are.
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In terms of due process (including habeas corpus), and the death
penalty, the print press, with some exceptions, is delinquent. With
even fewer exceptions, reportage by television news in this and
other areas might have made Jefferson weep. From television's
coverage of pivotal Supreme Court decisions of any kind, for in-
stance, it would be nearly impossible for anyone to understand
even minimally what happens during each judicial term. The citi-
zenry is left largely ignorant of pervasive violations of due process
throughout the judicial system.
Locally, they see what the reporters call "the perp walk". The
alleged perpetrator, having been arrested, is escorted with his coat
over his face to his just deserts. He is already guilty.
You have to go through extensive files of newspapers in any city
to find a clear definition of due process or the reason the writ of
habeas corpus is in the Constitution. Floyd Abrams once said that
the only part of the Bill of Rights that the press is passionately
committed to, and sometimes the only part it really knows, are the
words "of the press" in the First Amendment.
It's true that a few papers, notably the New York Times and the
Washington Post gave more than cursory coverage to the Leonel
Herrera "actual innocence" case.55 But there were key facts, very
dramatic facts, that really were like Orsen Welles's "A Touch of
Evil" in Sandy D'Alemberte's brief in that case that never made it
into the press. Except for relatively few reporters, like David
Elliot of the Austin American Statesman who has been writing
about the case of Gary Graham, most reporters and editors are not
much moved to action by the words due process or habeas corpus.
On July 23, 1993, Don Edwards' Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights (I wish he rather than Joe Biden were in-
volved in the habeas corpus write-up) held a hearing on procedural
protections for criminal defendants. Four of the witnesses had
nearly been executed, but because they finally had decent counsel
they were able to prove their innocence. Pretty dramatic stuff. I
saw nothing about the hearing on television and may have missed
some of the print press, but I didn't see anything there either.
The same thing happened to Senator Metzenbaum's April
1st hearing on innocence and the death penalty. Senator
Metzenbaum's decision to retire is a great loss for anyone who
hopes to curb, to some extent, the Rehnquist Court's obsession
55. See, e.g., John Tucker, The Rehnquist Rush to Execute; Should States Get the
Final Say?, WASH. POST, Apr: 26, 1992, at Cl; Nat Hentoff, When Guilt or Innocence
'Doesn't Matter', WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at A31.
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with dismembering habeas corpus. Among those testifying were
people who had been convicted and sentenced to death but were
freed just in time. I saw no press on that hearing and I asked
Senator Metzenbaum's press secretary what she had seen. "Noth-
ing," she said.
The press has done very little to clarify, or to expose, really,
some of the propaganda by the advocates of the death penalty. By
the way, I do not think you can talk about habeas corpus reform
without the passion of the death penalty. It's impossible, as I think
you've heard this morning. A term used very often by Chief
Justice Rehnquist is the so-called "urgent need for finality." That
is a real Orwellian term. It also was used, I was dismayed to see,
by Justice Ginsburg in her confirmation hearing. But, as Judge
William Norris of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals puts it, "A
human life is at stake. I fail to understand the rush to judgment."56
There is a grim warning, particularly to politicians at election
time, that if they become "soft" on capital punishment, the "fiend"
will get out in a few years and stalk your neighborhood. However,
(and this was reported in the Wall Street Journal but it's not in
many other places), the Death Penalty Information Center points
out that the perception that a murderer convicted of a capital crime
will be back on the streets in seven years or less if not given the
death penalty is totally inaccurate.57 Thirty-three states plus the
District of Columbia and the federal government impose life
sentences without parole. 58 All other states require those sen-
tenced to life for capital murder to serve at least twenty years.59
But a key reason the majority of the public does not want to let go
of the death penalty is the belief that a life sentence for capital
murder really means release after several years. How come that
disinformation is still prevalent? Because the press doesn't correct
it.
Most Americans are also ignorant because they are not other-
wise informed of a point made by Justice Thurgood Marshall at the
56. See Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021, 1032 (9th Cir. 1993) (Norris, J.,
dissenting).
57. RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, SENTENCING
FOR LIFE: AMERICANS EMBRACE ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEATH PENALTY (Apr.
1993) ("Forty-five states and the federal government now employ sentences in which
parole is impossible for at least 25 years for their more serious murder cases. In two-
thirds of the states those who are not given the death penalty face life imprisonment
with no possibility of parole ever. Yet only 4% of Americans believe that those con-
victed of first degree murder would spend the rest of their lives in prison . . .
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Second Circuit Judicial Conference in September, 1988. Marshall
cited a case in which the defendant's lawyer "did not inform the
jury the petitioner had no criminal record, had been steadily em-
ployed, had an honorable military record, had been a regular
churchgoer, and had cooperated with the police. '' 60 During the
sentencing phase, Justice Marshall continued, this very casual ad-
vocate did not give the jury a single reason why they should spare
the petitioner his life. 61 Now take this. The Federal Appeals Court
ruled that the lawyer's performance was not constitutionally defi-
cient.62 Did the press take note? This does not astonish anyone in
this room or anyone who reads the American Lawyer or the Na-
tional Law Journal, but the great majority of voters do not read
such publications, they do not see Bryan Stevenson, Steve Bright,
or Sandy D'Alemberte all that often, if at all, on television. So,
most of the citizenry are largely unaware of how useless the term
"due process" is for many capital defendants.
Another example of information that doesn't get out concerns
Congressman John Lewis of Georgia, a legend in the civil rights
movement. During the 1960's, he was almost summarily executed,
not by the State - although the State was sort of involved by not
doing anything - but by mobs of racists. He was a strong sup-
porter of Bill Clinton during the primaries and later. His support
was effective because of the respect in which he is held. Then, in
1993, John Lewis wrote a public letter to the President with regard
to "your administration's position on the death penalty." I doubt
anything quite like it has been publicly addressed to any President
in the past by a member of Congress who was a key supporter.
Congressman Lewis' letter said that "[w]hile the rest of the world is
moving away from death as a form of punishment, capital punish-
ment is becoming more entrenched in some parts of our coun-
try."' 63 Congressman Lewis cited a 1990 study by the General
Accounting Office that found a pattern of evidence indicating ra-
cial disparities in the imposition of death sentences in state courts
throughout the country.64 He also urged the President to firmly
60. See Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1088, 1090 (1986). Messer was subsequently executed.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Nat Hentoff, Capital Punishment - A Matter of Fundamental Fairness,
WASH. POST, May 8, 1993, at A21.
64. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RE-
SEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG.
REC. S6889-90 (daily ed. May 24, 1990).
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reject attacks by Congress and the Chief Justice on habeas corpus.
"The right of Americans," he said, "to a full review of federal con-
stitutional claims in the federal courts should not be
compromised. "65
That's news, it seems to me. A black Congressman of enormous
integrity confronting a President who has been an executioner as
Governor with a plea that he show some courage. So far as I
know, no paper or television news operation - maybe in Atlanta,
but nowhere else - picked up on that letter, except for one
columnist.
Having indicted the press, I should now focus on emphasizing to
editors and assignment editors what can be done to improve the
situation. It seems to me what is needed is education of the press.
I suggest, and there may well be better variations of this idea, that
in each city there be informal meetings between members of the
ABA and editorial staffs of both newspapers and television sta-
tions. A confrontational approach would not be advisable. We
journalists have thinner skins than cops accused of police brutality.
But journalists are by nature curious, particularly about ways to get
more stories and make those stories sound authoritative. It also
might be useful to include in these discussions local district attor-
neys and judges, as well as public defenders, and, where possible,
defendants analyzing the quality of their defenses.
Of course, I would like to see Bryan Stevenson make a tour of
the cities at those meetings. Among other benefits for the journal-
ists, getting to know some of these people in an informal way might
well add to their sources for future stories. And perhaps most en-
lightening to the reporters and the editors would be hearing some
district attorneys explain what they mean by "due process." It
gives new life to George Orwell's term: "newspeak".
DEAN REDLICH:
You may be interested to know that shortly after I became Dean
at NYU Law School, I had the idea of having a seminar to educate
the print and electronic media about basic aspects of the legal sys-
tem, including the criminal justice system and legal ethics. We did
get some financial support for this program from the New York
Times Foundation, but the problem was that it was almost impossi-
ble to get an audience of news people. The media simply did not
want to give time off on a paid basis for reporters of the print and
65. See Hentoff, supra note 63.
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electronic media to attend a seminar of this kind. I was greatly
disappointed. It seems that the media's curiousity does not extend
to learning something about what they are supposed to write.
As I mentioned in our introduction, Assemblywoman Susan
John first came to my attention when I heard about this candidate
from upstate New York who was opposed to the death penalty and
needed help. Susan John currently represents the 131st Assembly
District in the Assembly. She is a member of the Judiciary, Educa-
tion, Codes, Corrections, Governmental Operations and Energy
standing committees. She chairs the Subcommittee on Public
School Violence and Constitutional Amendments.
Assemblywoman John is author of the New York State's Stalk-
ing Law, which became effective in 1992, and the 1993 Healthcare
Facilities Access Bill. She is a graduate of George Washington
University and Syracuse University Law School. She worked for
Congressman, now Senator, Paul Simon and for former Senator
Adlai Stevenson. She was in private practice in Syracuse before
being elected to office. She has been active in many local bar and
non-profit organizations, co-chairs the Monroe County Bar's Leg-
islative Committee, and has been an attorney for the Volunteer
Legal Services Project. Susan John embodies the best of what our
profession aspires to be, and we're pleased to welcome Susan John.
SUSAN JOHN
Thank you and good morning. I'm really delighted to be part of
this panel. I want to tell you a little bit about my story and also
comment a little bit on what some of the other speakers have said.
As an overview, I think that the one bit of good news from a
politician's perspective, is that the death penalty is not an issue that
the electorate votes on. It really isn't. People do not go out and
vote for someone because they are in favor of the death penalty. I
do think some people may have voted for me because I was op-
posed to it, and it's something that they felt deeply down in their
souls.
I think that that message is important, because I hope that some
of the people sitting in this room who are opposed to the death
penalty may decide to take that into action by running for office
someday. People do not vote against you because you are opposed
to the death penalty, and they don't vote for you because you are
in favor of it. My opponent proved that.
In January, 1990, I was a liberal Democrat working as a commer-
cial corporate lawyer in a fine private firm in Rochester, New
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York, and I was in the process of encouraging people to run in a
Democratic primary against a conservative Democrat who repre-
sented my district in the state legislature for fourteen years.
Through a convoluted set of developments, I found myself an-
nouncing my candidacy in March 1990.
I remember April 19th of that year perhaps more clearly than a
number of other days because that's the day that my opponent, a
gentleman by the name of Gary Proud, announced by press release
that he was switching his position on the death penalty.66 For four-
teen years, including earlier that year in March, he had voted
against the death penalty.67 The press release said that he felt that
there had been changes made to the proposed legislation that
would prevent the possibility of mistakes from happening in the
administration of the death penalty and that therefore he would
provide the 100th vote in the New York State Assembly to over-
ride the expected veto from the Governor.68
Well, of course, I had a number a reactions to this news. At first,
I thought, well now, this is really going to become an issue in the
election. Before, we had been on the same side of the issue. There
was a serial murderer in Rochester that year who was going to trial
just four days before our election,69 whose case would provide the
perfect backdrop for all of the typical kinds of emotional discussion
that you hear about the death penalty. And yet I also couldn't help
but feel that perhaps I was somebody who had taken a rather
egotistical and selfish step. I had decided to run for office. I had
never run for anything before. I had never held elected office. I
had not mapped out a career in which I intended to run for office.
And yet, because I had made the decision to challenge this long-
term incumbent in my party, he was now going to give New York
the death penalty. These were a very hard few hours for me, when
I really let that all sink in. Fortunately, there were people like
Ron Tabak and Norman Redlich and other people in the state who
were committed to telling me that I could still get elected, even
66. See Dick Zander, New Life For Capital Punishment in NY?, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Apr. 25, 1990, at 66.
67. Id.
68. See Rex Smith, Key Shift on Death Penalty Assemblyman's Vote May be Last
One Needed for Override of Veto, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 20, 1990, at 7 ("Assemb. Gary
Proud (D-Rochester) said he would drop his long-standing opposition to the death
penalty for murder because the bill's sponsor has agreed to add an amendment ensur-
ing that the state's top court will review 'the quality of the evidence' in all death
penalty cases.").
69. See id. (discussing arrest of Arthur Shawcross, paroled killer and suspect in
killings in Rochester area).
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though the death penalty would be an issue in the campaign. And
they were right.
Here are the facts. The death penalty is not a deterrent.70 The
death penalty is discriminatory, both on an economic and a racial
basis.71 The death penalty is expensive72 -it will be even more
expensive if we adopt some of the changes that were described by
the Attorney General earlier. Whenever someone is put to death,
there is the possibility of mistakes. You know all of those things.
Most people in the general public don't know those things. I would
talk to people about why I was opposed to the death penalty when
it came up in the television debate, the radio debate, and on peo-
ple's doorsteps. I would go through all the reasons. I would tell
them who the people were that had been executed in New York
State, and what the facts are about the homicide rate in states like
Texas and Florida that do have a death penalty.73 Once people
heard the facts, they were no longer sure that they were in favor of
the death penalty.
The most important thing for an elected person, or one who
hopes to become elected, is to educate the public about the facts on
the death penalty, including the fact that the death penalty does
not help the victims of crime. For those who try to wave the flag of
the victims, this is not the appropriate issue. There are ways to
help victims of crime. There is plenty of legislation that can be
enacted to provide the open assistance of government. But the
death penalty is not the way to assist the victims of crime.
Here in New York we have managed to keep the death penalty
from becoming state law, but it has been a very difficult battle.
When I ran in 1990, as I told you, there were almost a hundred
"yes" votes in the state assembly: one hundred votes would have
been enough votes to override the governor's veto. This means that
if our governor does not continue to be governor at any point in
70. See M. RADELET & M. VANDIVER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1988) (reviewing post-1972 empirical stud-
ies on death penalty and finding no criminologist in the U.S. in the past 15 years that
claimed to find data indicating that the death penalty has a deterrent effect greater
than lengthy imprisonment); see also supra note 53.
71. See supra note 67 (discussing GAO Report finding racial discrimination in the
imposition of the death penalty).
72. See generally Robert L. Spangenburg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punish-
ment or Life Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 45
(1989) (analysis of the costs associated with the death penalty); Ronald J. Tabak & J.
Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-Of-Benefit Analysis of the
Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 59, 133-38 (1989).
73. See supra note 52.
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the future, we have a very serious situation in the state legislature.
The death penalty bill passes overwhelmingly each year in the state
senate and the state assembly, and it is only because the state as-
sembly has too few votes for the override of the governor's veto
that New York doesn't have the death penalty.
So, what do we do if we don't have a governor there to veto it?
And what do we do if, as some have proposed, an amendment is
made to the New York State constitution to impose a death sen-
tence through the constitution that does not require the signature
of the governor? That is a question that must pass two different
legislatures, and if it did, it would go on the ballot for the general
public to decide whether or not New York should join the list of
states that impose the death penalty.
It is too easy for people to get caught up in the death penalty as
part of the broader movement in this state, and in this country, for
stronger criminal penalties. We have imposed mandatory mini-
mum sentences and we have seen just how much "safer" all of us
have felt over the past twenty years. We have seen the bursting at
the seams of the New York State prisons so that we have almost
tripled our prison population in the last ten years. It is important, I
think, that the death penalty be used as part of the discussion to
persuade people why harsher penalties are not the answer.
Bryan spoke earlier, movingly, of what he witnesses when he
goes out to talk to the siblings of the people that he represents. I
know that in this city, young men talk about how their friends have
gone away "to get strong." That means that they are upstate in
prison, where they get three meals a day, have a roof over their
heads, and don't have to face the possibility of getting shot on the
street like many of their friends. In this city, there is tremendous
hopelessness among the youth. If you are a young African-Ameri-
can or Hispanic male and live in New York City, you are much
more likely to face death by gunshot than anything else.74
74. See REPORT OF FEDERAL CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, (ATLANTA, GA.
1990) (homicide rate among black males between the ages of 15-24 increased by 2/3 in
the last five years: "In some areas of the country it is now more likely for a black male
between his fifteenth and twenty-fifth birthday to die from homicide than it was for a
United States soldier to be killed on a tour of duty in Vietnam."); Peter B. Edelman,
Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81
GEO. L.J. 1697, 1699 n.8 (1993) (teenage black males in major cities more likely to die
from gunshot wounds than any other cause); Mel Reynolds, Gun Makers Must Pay the
Price, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb. 15, 1993, at N17 (FBI statistics demonstrate that gunshot
deaths among African American teenagers outnumber all natural causes of death
combined); Youths and Violence, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Aug. 10, 1993 (African
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And so while we have succeeded, to some extent, by stopping
the death penalty in New York State, it is important that we con-
tinue the fight. We must continue to come out against the death
penalty for the reasons that we feel it is wrong: It is not a deter-
rent, it is discriminatory, it is incredibly expensive, and there is al-
ways the possibility of mistake.
Finally I would just like to say because of my experience that,
yes, you can oppose the death penalty even in the midst of a trial of
a serial murderer and win, because the public perceives it as a mat-
ter of character and principle. They may disagree with your stance
but they understand that you have reasons - reasons, not politics
- for taking that position.
If any of you ever find yourself to be in the good fortune of run-
ning or supporting a candidate who is running for office who is
opposed to the death penalty, I would be more than happy to sit
down with that candidate and talk to him or her about the reasons
for being opposed to it, how to present the issue, and how to han-
dle it in a political campaign and not to get caught up in the
pressure.
Since my election, we have elected two other people from Roch-
ester to the state legislature who are opposed to the death penalty.
Although no one does anything single-handedly, I helped both of
those candidates to understand more clearly and in a way they
could describe to the average person why they were opposed, and
what was wrong, and what we should be doing instead. I remain
convinced that it is only through changing the legislative bodies
that we will be able to stop the death penalty from being imposed
in this country.
DEAN REDLICH:
Thank you. Organizing a political action committee to support
candidates like Susan John in other states is doable, and people will
give money for that purpose. We have had that experience here.
The interest of this panel is demonstrated by the fact that we
have two late entries, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania and
Chief Justice Exum of North Carolina, who gives us the perspective
of a justice of the highest court of one of our states. We are very
pleased to welcome to this panel an outstanding jurist and the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
American males are 11 times more likely to die by homicide than males of any other
race, and homicide is most common cause of death for African American youth).
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CHIEF JUSTICE EXUM:
Thank you, Dean Redlich. I was suddenly, without notice com-
mandeered to come here yesterday, and in looking over the nature
of the program, I realize there is one question in particular on
which you might want me to comment. That question is: Can
elected state judges survive if they sometimes overturn death
sentences for constitutional error? And as a corollary to that ques-
tion: Is political death the inevitable consequence of opposing capi-
tal punishment? I can offer, I think, some perspectives on both of
those issues.
We do elect our judges in North Carolina, and we elect them on
a partisan political basis. We run as Democrats or Republicans.
This had not been too much of a problem in our state because, for
most of our history, the Democratic party has been in control of
the political machinery and almost all of our judges were Demo-
crats. The judges who got their positions by appointments were
rarely opposed (although it was always theoretically possible for
them to be opposed). But to the extent that they were opposed, it
was usually in a Democratic primary; there was rarely any opposi-
tion at the general election.
But North Carolina has, in the last decade or so, become a truly
two-party state. Both of our Senators are Republicans, and we
have had two Republican governors. Therefore, the political situa-
tion regarding our judiciary has greatly changed, to the extent that
now whenever a judge, particularly an appellate judge, whether the
judge be Republican or Democrat, comes up for re-election, that
judge is almost inevitably opposed by a candidate from the oppo-
site party.
I ran to fill a vacancy on our court in 1974, and I won the Demo-
cratic primary and had no Republican opposition in the general
election. My views on the death penalty are unusually well docu-
mented for a judge in my state because, before becoming a judge, I
was a North Carolina legislator. As a legislator, I voted for the
abolition of the death penalty. That fact was and is well known in
North Carolina.
In 1986, I was acting the Senior Associate Justice of the North
Carolina Supreme Court when the Chief Justice retired. It had long
been a tradition in our state for the Senior Associate Justice to be
appointed by the governor to fill the vacancy in the Chief Justice-
ship. However, in this case, the governor was of the opposite polit-
ical party. Instead of following tradition, he elected to name the
junior justice on the court, whom he had recently appointed and
270
DEATH PENALTY
who was the only Republican on the court, to be the Chief Justice.
I had already been nominated by the Democratic party as its candi-
date for Chief Justice. Therefore, we had a contested race in the
fall of 1986 for the position of Chief Justice. My views on the death
penalty became very much an issue in the campaign because my
opponents emphasized my personal opposition to it. I made no
secret about that during the campaign, acknowledging that, indeed,
I was personally against the death penalty. I also made clear that
as an associate justice, I had recognized my obligation to enforce
this law, capital punishment, because the legislator had decreed
that it be the law in North Carolina, and that I had voted to sustain
a large number of capital sentences imposed by our trial courts.
Shortly after reaching the court as an associate justice, I had the
occasion to write a concurring opinion in the first capital case in
which I voted to sustain a death sentence. In that opinion, I set out
my views that while I remained a person opposed to the death pen-
alty on public policy grounds, I did not believe that the death pen-
alty was unconstitutional per se under either our state of the
federal constitution.7" The North Carolina Constitution expressly
provides for death as a penalty,76 so there is not much ground for
maneuvering there. The United States Supreme Court ultimately
settled the issue as regards the federal constitution.77
So, that concurring opinion was on the books. Thus, while the
issue of my views on the death penalty figured very large in the
campaign for Chief Justice, I was able to demonstrate that although
I didn't personally believe in capital punishment as a matter of
public policy, I do not think it unconstitutional and had been able
to enforce the death penalty as an appellate judge.
Some of the campaign debate got really grizzly. My opponents
would bring up all the times I had dissented in cases involving the
imposition of the death penalty, and I had to come back and
demonstrate all the times I had concurred in cases sustaining the
death penalty. So, it emerged into a battle of statistics.
In any event, I was elected and became Chief Justice of our state
court in 1987. I have been serving the state of North Carolina in
that capacity ever since.
75. State v. Woodson, 215 S.E.2d 607, 619-21 (1975).
76. See N.C. CONST. Art. II, § 2 (1944) ("Death Punishment: The object of punish-
ment, being not only to satisfy justice, but also to reform the offender and thus pre-
vent crime, murder, arson, burglary, and rape, and these only, may be punishable with
death, if the General Assembly shall so enact.").
77. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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I was up for re-election in 1990 and again had an opponent from
the opposite party. The death penalty once again became an issue
in that campaign, although not quite to the extent to which it had
been in the earlier campaign. My re-election was somewhat easier
than my first election, although the issue of the death penalty was
still an obstacle.
So, I guess on the question of whether elected state judges can
survive if they sometimes overturn death sentences, the answer is
yes, they can, but I believe it is becoming more and more difficult.
I think the public clamor for the death penalty is becoming more
shrill. I'll close those comments with an illustration. Our court re-
cently handed down an opinion in a case in which a defendant had
been sentenced to death for the murder of a police officer in the
city of Charlotte, our state's largest city.7" The crime problem in
Charlotte has become one of the major issues in that city. There-
fore, the city officials, leadership, and newspapers have become
rightly concerned and want to do something to improve the situa-
tion and attack the problem.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in that capital case unani-
mously agreed there was error in the jury selection process when a
defense challenge for cause of a particular juror was denied. The
juror had seemed confused about the presumption of innocence
and the duty of the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court unanimously felt the challenge for cause should have
been granted. Defendant ultimately removed this juror perempto-
rily and thereafter exhausted all peremptory challenges. There-
fore, he was unable peremptorily to challenge a juror whom he
sought to remove and who ultimately sat on the case. We con-
cluded that the error required reversal and was not subject to
harmless error analysis because it resulted in a juror sitting on the
case who was unacceptable to defendant and who, absent the error,
defendant would have been able to remove peremptorily.
There followed what we considered to be an unfair critique of
the opinion in an op-ed article that appeared in the Charlotte Ob-
server.79 The article took the court to task for its opinion and con-
tended that even if there was error in the denial of the challenge
for cause, the error could not have been prejudicial. The court's
78. State v. Cunningham, 429 S.E.2d 718 (N.C. 1993).
79. See Thomas J. Ashcraft, The Court and the Cop Killer in a Sorry Display of
Legal Gamesmanship, Justice was the Loser, CHARLOTM OBSERVER, July 14, 1993, at
13A ("In the Cunningham case, the justices made an ass of the law by employing
hyper-technical analysis to avoid a just result, the execution of a repeat killer.").
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conclusion that the error required a new trial was, according to the
article, simply ridiculous. The article failed to point out that this
kind of jury-selection error, under our precedents and, I think,
under the precedents of most jurisdictions, is simply not subject to
harmless error analysis. The article, authored by Mr. Thomas J.
Ashcraft, who, I understand, is a Republican attorney, noted that
all current members of the Supreme Court are Democrats, a point
not usually made in lawyerly critiques of appellate court opinions.
After the article was published, there was an editorial cartoon in
the Charlotte Observer depicting an outreached hand holding a
briefcase on which were written the words "confidence in the
North Carolina judicial system or criminal justice system." Hulk-
ing over the hand with the briefcase was a robed figure, labeled
"Chief Justice Exum" holding a hatchet poised to chop off the
hand holding the briefcase.
We understand that we are subject to criticism for our judicial
opinions, and we welcome fair criticism. But, I would have thought
that a great paper like the Charlotte Observer, and it is a great pa-
per; I know most of the editors on the paper personally, I respect
them and we've enjoyed good relationships, instead of feeding the
frenzy which this kind of decision can generate, would have taken
the time to more carefully analyze the opinion. The paper should
have pointed out that while you might disagree with the court's
judgment about whether the particular juror should have been ex-
cused for cause, once that judgment was made, the error in failing
to excuse the juror for cause required a new trial because it was not
subject to harmless error analysis.
I think the more this type of thing occurs in our state judiciaries,
the less likely it is going to be that the state judges will be able to
survive if they sometimes overturn death sentences. Three years
ago I announced that I would not seek reelection after my current
term expires in 1998. I plan to resign. I'm glad I will not have to
run again.
DEAN REDLICH:
Thanks to the discipline of our speakers, after seven speakers we
still have some time. Now I know the panelists can't wait to talk
about what each person said, but I say to my fellow panelists: think
about how impatient the people in the audience are. They have
been listening to all seven or eight of us, and so before giving the
panelists an opportunity to comment, I would ask the audience if
you have any questions. I will enforce a "no speeches" rule, but if
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you have any questions that you would like to address to any mem-
bers of the panel or the panel as whole, I would be pleased to rec-
ognize some.
AUDIENCE: Addressing Attorney General Preate, you de-
scribed the role of the courts in death penalty cases as being on the
cutting edge of constitutional law and, of course, that's true, and
one of the areas of concern in those developments has been what
Professor Coleman has described about Teague v. Lane and its ef-
fect in cutting back on developing constitutional law and habeas
corpus. I was wondering what you could tell us about what the
new legislation proposes to do in that area.
ATTORNEY GENERAL PREATE: In the area of retroactiv-
ity, new rules go back to Justice Harlan's opinions in Desist and
Mackey but do not continue to maintain the Teague v. Lane doc-
trine. It is essential to gain prosecutors' support for this legislation,
and the point I am making here is that there are tradeoffs. Nat
Hentoff talked about Herrera. On the other hand, this final ver-
sion codifies and extends Herrera. It creates a whole new right that
didn't exist before. So, talking about ways in which we can have a
rational discourse on this very important issue, I think that's what
we tried to do. But there are a number of places in the legislation
where lawyers got together and rationally looked at, free of rheto-
ric, this very important complex area of the law.
AUDIENCE: Also for Attorney General Preate, regarding your
proposals to put more resources into indigent defense in capital
cases. People don't want to pay for public schools that their kids
don't attend. They don't want to pay for subways they don't use.
So, as a practical political matter, how are you going to persuade
them to spend money defending poor people who they probably
assume are guilty anyway?
ATTORNEY GENERAL PREATE: I think that that's a good
question as to how we can pay for it. The bill is not an appropria-
tion measure. It is an authorization measure. But again, it has the
enormous force and impact of folks who are very politically astute
and powerful in Congress and the Senate. The requirement here is
to provide funding from the federal government of seventy-five
percent of the money for counsel and for resource centers, and
twenty-five percent of it is to come from the state, and this has
been agreed to by prosecutors. If you get prosecutors to agree to
something of this nature, it takes the shrillness of the debate out of
the issue.
DEATH PENALTY
NAT HENTOFF: Was there any input in this draft from the de-
fense bar?
ATTORNEY GENERAL PREATE: Nat, there was no input
from the defense bar.
NAT HENTOFF: Then how do you say it's been debated?
ATTORNEY GENERAL PREATE: I didn't say there was a
debate, Nat.
NAT HENTOFF: Oh, you just used the word.
ATTORNEY GENERAL PREATE: I said out of the debate,
out of the debate that would come in the future on the question of
authorization of an appropriation of money. The habeas corpus
reform and the kinds of things we're talking about could not pro-
ceed unless the prosecutors of America - and there are several in
the audience here today - unless they agreed to this provision.
Otherwise, you would not move this issue forward. We have
moved it forward, we have agreed in a lot of respects. Not every-
body agrees with everything in the Biden bill. Not everybody
agrees with everything in Senator Hatch's bill and Senator Dole's
bill. There are some good points in both those bills and its going to
be up to the Congress and the Senate to sort it all out, but the
matter has been brought down to the point of rational discourse.
BRYAN STEVENSON: I think this question is very, very well
taken, and I would encourage anyone who is involved in this pro-
cess around legislation and around these kind of issues, particularly
counsel issues, to ask that question over and over again. It is re-
ally the determining influence in whether these things make a dif-
ference. I come from the State of Alabama, for example. We have
a resource center, and notwithstanding the kind of recognition that
even Attorney General Preate mentioned for the whole notion of
resources centers, we don't get a penny from the State of Alabama,
even though the federal government promised to match funding if
the State of Alabama provided support. Our center exists solely
because we raise money from private sources to create non-federal
support to justify the grants that we seek. It's a very difficult pro-
cess. It's very time-consuming. Running around giving speeches to
raise three hundred dollars here and three hundred dollars there is
not an efficient way to manage the system of justice. And the same
thing is true of other states, particularly in the "death belt" of
Texas or Louisiana or Mississippi. A lot of these states don't give
any funding for the work that is being done, and in addition to that,
there is still this very irrational political dynamic that comes from
people, not necessarily prosecutors, but sometimes prosecutors,
1994]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
too, in challenging even that. This year in fact there were motions
made, and bills produced in both the House and the Senate, to
totally eliminate funding for resource centers under the present re-
gime and, as a result, their fundings will probably be cut back fifty
percent. A very important question to consider in evaluating any
provision is whether the funds will be there to make it meaningful.
DEAN REDLICH: Would any of our other panelists like to
comment on that? Susan?
SUSAN JOHN: Even here in New York State where we provide
some limited funding for a center to help public defenders around
the state, every year when New York State's budget passes, there is
an amendment to eliminate that funding. That always has to be
defeated. And the political reality is that to the extent that we are
able to provide resources to the public defenders in this state, it is
only by providing an equal amount or two or three times that
amount, to the District Attorneys in the state. There is always that
formula. That's part of the political reality even here in New York
State, where people think that we're a little more liberal than some
other states.
CHIEF JUSTICE EXUM: I am glad to say that we in North
Carolina do find state funding for our death penalty resource
center, and we also get federal funding. We have to battle for it in
each session of the general assembly but they have done it.
DEAN REDLICH: Thank you, Chief Justice....
ATTORNEY GENERAL PREATE: I want to add one more
thing. The hammer here [in the Biden Bill] to get funding is that
the states would not get their full share of crime-fighting funds
from the federal government, that would be reduced by seventy-
five percent. That means all the drug-fighting funds that would be
coming from the federal government, for example, to the state,
would be reduced by seventy-five percent. Now that's an enor-
mous hammer of the federal government over the head of the state
to come up with certification authority, to come up with funds for
capital resource centers, to come with reasonable counsel fees and
investigative fees.
DEAN REDLICH: This is Jack MacKenzie of the New York
Times.
JACK MacKENZIE: I would like to ask the Attorney General
another question about this rational discourse and when it will be-
gin. Was the defense bar also excluded in the dealings with the
Justice Department over the Biden bill?
276
DEATH PENALTY
ATITORNEY GENERAL PREATE: No one was excluded.
As far as I was concerned, Senator Biden could ask anybody in the
world that he wanted to get advice, and so could Janet Reno and so
could Howard Metzenbaum and anyone else who was participat-
ing. But we were asked to work with them. We did work with
them. The Bill is now on the table. It's open for rational discourse.
JACK MacKENZIE: No, I didn't say you excluded them. I said
were they excluded?
ATTORNEY GENERAL PREATE: Not to my knowledge.
Anybody could talk to Senator Biden any time or Janet Reno at
any time. The point I'm making is that now there's a bill that is
submitted to Congress at least on the Senate side, and it is now
open for rational discourse.
BRYAN STEVENSON: I have just one comment on this.
Again, it is not directed to substance. With regard to the question
about the process, I guess I consider myself a member of the de-
fense bar, and I am certainly not aware of any people who do de-
fense work in capital cases in the habeas community that were very
involved, and certainly not in a position of negotiation, on the
terms of this Bill. So, I do think it's fair to say that the defense bar
was not involved in these discussions; and whether substantive pro-
visions that have come out of that are acceptable is something I
still cannot say - I still have not seen this bill - but I do think it's
fair to say that there was a question about process around this that
ultimately says something about whether or not we are engaged in
a rational discourse.
AUDIENCE: Not to pick on the Attorney General, but I would
like to address my question to you. Does the fact that the man to
your right, Shabaka, that he was nearly executed by mistake, does
that suggest to you that there is a casualness about life that is per-
haps disturbing in the death penalty, and what does that say about
the death penalty in general?
ATTORNEY GENERAL PREATE: I don't know the facts
about Shabaka's case, but this is a very serious matter. There is no
more serious matter and I take my responsibilities, as every prose-
cutor that I know takes them, very seriously. We don't ask for the
death penalty in every single case nor are we permitted to ask for it
in every single case. But I think we believe that our system of jus-
tice needs to be improved. We are part of the system, we have
responsibility to insure that the innocent are set free just as much
as the guilty are convicted, and one of my proudest moments as a
prosecutor was standing up in the middle of the trial saying, "I can-
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not proceed to convict this man of first-degree murder because
now in my heart I believe he is innocent because the witness lied to
me in the privacy of my office, the key witness." And I told that to
the judge, and he stopped the trial, and it took a lot of courage to
do that. You just don't do that in every single case, but that's our
responsibility, and it's just like the Deputy Attorney General in
Florida stood up at the hearing Shabaka mentioned and said that
he believed that Shabaka was innocent. That's our responsibility to
do that, and you and I may differ, and some of the others may
differ, on the merits of the death penalty, but it is there, and has
been upheld as constitutional. Now, let's talk about it in terms of
our responsibility to the profession. That's what I'm here to talk
about.
DEAN REDLICH: I started the substantive part of the discus-
sion by exercising the privilege of introducing myself and I would
like to conclude the substantive part of it by quoting myself. I
would like to read to you just a couple of paragraphs from a docu-
ment that I wrote and that was submitted to a New York State
Commission on the Provision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code,
and it was as follows:
The administration of Criminal Justice is designed to establish
proof of criminal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because of a
recognition that our system contains too many uncertainties to
permit a standard of no doubt. Yet, the death penalty assumes a
standard of guilt beyond any doubt and is applied in those cases
where the doubts are the greatest. The death penalty assumes
that we know all the answers about criminal responsibility, crim-
inal intent, the finding of fact, the choosing of juries. The death
penalty assumes a perfect system although the system itself rec-
ognized long ago that it could never meet a standard of perfec-
tion and therefore created a standard of reasonable doubt.
Similarly, the death penalty is irreconcilable with the system of
penal administration, which speaks in terms of rehabilitation,
deterrence and public security. The dead cannot be rehabili-
tated. All the evidence demonstrates that capital punishment is
not a unique deterrent to murder, and public security is actually
endangered by the retention of the penalty that creates a false
sense of protection, thereby distracting the public from coming
to grips with the realities of crime prevention and prison
rehabilitation.
The electric chair is the ultimate symbol of irrationality, ven-
geance, discrimination, the embodiment of all we've tried to
overcome in the march toward a humane and rational system of
criminal justice. It is like a cancerous growth that affects the
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entire body of our penal system from the moment a crime is
committed to the time the prisoner has had the last contact with
the State. It affects the behavior of the police, the press, prose-
cutors, juries, lawyers, judges - everyone who has any contact
with the administration of justice. It makes a humane system of
punishment impossible because it sets a benchmark of irrational
vengeance from which all other punishments are measured.
I read that statement before the commission on December 7,
1962. It was an important message then. Tragically, thirty-one
years later, I think it is even more important now. And if I've
abused the privileges of the chair by making a substantive com-
ment, I apologize to you and to the panelists, and I thank all of you
for being here.
I will ask Ron Tabak to make a few announcements to you.
Thank you very much.
RONALD J. TABAK: I would like to thank Dean Redlich and
all the members of the panel for their excellent presentation.
There is a crying need, as you have probably figured out from
this program, if you didn't know it before, for lawyers to volunteer
to represent death row inmates once they have had their first ap-
peal. In the state of Texas alone there are currently at least four
people under warrant of death who have no lawyers. Esther
Lardent, in the front row here, is the head of the ABA Postconvic-
tion Death Penalty Project, of which Sally Determan, also in the
front row, is the chair. If you have the courage and the commit-
ment to learn how to do these - and it can be done, I am proof of
that, a civil lawyer who handled one of these cases and wound up
in the Supreme Court a year later - you can do it. Esther would
be happy to sign you up and get you all the training you need. And
you can work with someone like Bryan at the Alabama Resource
Center, which also needs help.
If you would like to be involved in the ABA's strong support of
habeas corpus - and among other people, Judge Sylvia Bacon
who I notice here, was a major contributor toward getting the
ABA to take the strong position in support of habeas that it's
taken - or if you would like to be involved in the ABA Individual
Rights and Responsibilities Section's Death Penalty Committee,
please see me after the program. Finally, if you know anybody
who might wish to watch a video tape of this program, let me know
because the people who have been videotaping are from Skadden,
Arps, to which I am special counsel, and we will be happy to pro-
vide videotapes for either no fee or a very reasonable one for any-
body who would like one. Thank you very much.
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